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MACROECONOMIC INSTABILITY AND THE STRATEGIES OF 
THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN BRAZIL: 
STANDSTILL, RETRENCHMENT OR DIVESTMENT? 
Reinaldo Gonçalves* 
ABSTRACT 
In the last decade, macroeconomic instability has had significant impact on TNCs' 
performance and strategic behavior in Brazil By and large, TNCs have been able to change 
their trade, financial, investment and technological strategical strategies to deal with the 
economic crisis. The available evidence suggests that TNCs seem to have adopted a "standstill 
strategy" with respect to Brazil all over the last decade. This defensive strategy seems to have 
evolved to a "retrenchment strategy" in the last few years. Macroeconomic stabilization policies 
(especially, monetary polices) and the permissiveness of the Brazilian market have been the 
key determinants of TNCs' strategies. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The strategies of enterprises depend on the interaction of heterogeneous 
factors at different levels (product line, competitors, market contestability, 
buyers, suppliers, targets, evaluation of the environment, ownership-specific 
advantages and disadvantages, the values of the decision-makers etc.)^. 
Hence, the impact of macroeconomic instability in particular circumstances 
needs to be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
The general definition of strategy, which underlies the analysis in this 
study, is that "strategy includes a set of decisions on the relative choice 
regarding the use and the valorization of resources".^ 
With respect to the strategic behavior of TNCs, it is relevant to keep in 
mind that it depends not only upon goals and targets, but also on the 
predominance of different, although complementary, perspectives. The 
"industrial strategy" aims at strengthening the competitiveness through the 
choice of technology and products, as well as market control; whereas, the 
"financial strategy" emphasizes the management of the firm's assets.^ In the 
Professor of Economics at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and former economist of 
UNICTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), Genebra. 
' For an overview of models of business strategies, see Joffre and Koening (1985). 
^ Morvan (1988), p 424-
' See Morvan (1988), p.428 
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context of macroeconomic instability, it is also important to consider the trade 
strategies of TNCs which have a bearing on balance-of-payments 
adjustment. 
The basic objective of this study is to analyze the strategic reactions of 
TNCs vis-a-vis the macroeconomic instability of Brazil since the early 1980s. 
The central argument is that, although TNCs are still keeping a "qualified 
optimism" with respect to the Brazilian economy, they seem to have adopted, 
in general, a retrenchment strategy with respect to Brazil in the recent past. 
There are some reasons for that, much more related to past experience than 
the future prospects. 
The behavior of TNCs involve different combinations of strategies. Here, 
the scope for generalization is very limited. However, in the context of long-
term macroeconomic instability, it is likely that there is a predominance of the 
financial and trade strategies over the industrial strategy. Given the 
significant permissiveness of the domestic market and the trade barriers in 
Brazil, the argument can be advanced that TNCs have been much more 
prompt in adopting financial strategies than industrial strategies. 
The nature of the Brazilian macroeconomic instability (in a cause-and-
consequence relation with high interest rates and financial profits) have 
increased further the "revealed preference" for financial strategies rather than 
industrial strategies. Moreover, trade strategies have been become an 
important element of TNCs' belnavior due, in part, to government adjustment 
policies (export subsidies and import controls) and, in part, to the need to 
look for external markets to offset the shrinkage of the domestic market. 
Hence, TNCs seem to have only started to upgrade their industrial strategies 
as a reactive phenomenon to the very deep crisis that the Brazilian economy 
has had in the last three years. 
This study proceeds in the following manner. After this introduction, 
Section 1 presents an analysis of the question: How is the "Brazil risk" 
perceived by TNCs? The emphasis is laid on macroeconomic problems and 
the strategic behavior of TNCs. Section 2, 3 and 4 examine the following 
question: How do TNCs respond to macroeconomic instability in Brazil? More 
specifically. Section 2 examines the role of TNCs in the process of external 
adjustment of the Brazilian economy. In this regard a particularly sensitive 
issue relates to the trade strategy of TNCs in so far as the external 
disequilibrium and strong inflationary pressures are the basic elements of 
macroeconomic instability. Section 3 deals with financial strategies used by 
TNCs to overcome the macroeconomic problems, mostly, the inflationary 
process and high real interest rates. Section 4 presents a discussion of 
issues related directly to the industrial strategies of TNCs, and largely due to 
the shrinkage of the domestic market. 
The last section presents a summary of main conclusions of the study. As 
far as TNCs' general strategy for Brazil is concerned, one concludes that 
TNCs seem presently to be in a intermediary phase between a "standstill 
strategy", more specifically, TNCs are adopting a "retrenchment strategy". 
With respect to the empirical evidence, analysis and conclusions, a word 
of warning is in order here. The empirical evidence presented in this study is 
based on scattered data and information that have been found in the 
Brazilian press, mostly in the last few years, as well as in the specialized 
literature on TNCs in Brazil. In this regard, the scope for generalization is 
rather limited. It would obviously be misleading to describe general patterns 
of strategic behavior on the basis of the fragmentary evidence discussed in 
the paper. Without doubt, the strategic behavior of TNCs vis-a-vis 
macroeconomic instability in Brazil should be subject of further research so 
as to extend the analysis both in scope and in depth.'' 
1.THE "BRAZIL RISK" 
This section deals with the impact of macroeconomic instability on 
transnational corporations in Brazil. In this regard, one examines a basic 
question: How is the "Brazil risk" perceived by TNCs? 
As mentioned, care must be taken in interpreting the evidence discussed 
in this section. The information presented here is not based on a systematic 
survey as well as empirical studies on strategies of TNCs in Brazil are 
scarce. The analysis section is systematic to the extent that it aims at 
bringing together the information available in the specialized literature and in 
the press with respect to the strategic behavior of TNCs. One needs to 
interpret with great caution the public declarations, expectations and 
intentions put forth by executives of TNCs which are used in studies and 
press articles. 
In addition to the normal commercial risks associated with any business 
activity, transnational corporations are faced with three different types of risk 
which have a bearing on their strategies.^ They are the foreign exchange 
risk, the political risk and administrative risk. The first one involves the 
transactions in different currencies related to trade and financial flows. The 
political risk is associated with the fact that the TNC has important sources of 
economic and non-economic power and, therefore, governments (mainly in 
'' Two recent studies have carried out a more systematic analysis of the internal restructuring of 
TNCs in the last few years, Bielschowsky and Ferraz (1990) and Bielschowsky (1992). 
^ Jacquemot(1990), p. 4. 
less developed countries) tend be concerned about their sovereignty and the 
building up of countervailing forces. The administrative risk is related to the 
set of rules, laws and procedures which specifically regulates TNCs' 
operations (profit remittances, performance requirements, etc.). 
Within these broad categories it is always possible to define a more 
desagregated list of factors which affect the general business environment.^ 
Among these factors it is worth pointing out the following: political stability, 
currency exchange regulations, availability of labor, financial inducements by 
government, barriers to trade, size of market growth, price stability and 
performance requirements. '' Nevertheless, it seems that there is a 
consensus that market size and growth are the most important locational 
determinants of foreign direct investment.® 
As far the location-specific advantages of Brazil are concerned this is an 
important conclusion. By and large, market size and growth have been two 
basic attributes of the modern economic history of Brazil. Moreover, the 
general investment climate has historically been very favorable towards 
foreign capital and enterprises. In this regard, it is worth noting that Brazil 
ranked 12th in a list of 60 less developed countries, classified according to 
their risk in 1988-89.^ Most of the countries in the first positions were either 
the newly-industrializing countries of South-East Asia or the oil-exporting 
countries. 
Without doubt, macroeconomic instability has become a significant 
locational disadvantage for Brazil since the early 1980. Indeed most of the 
evidence found in the press indicates that the main reasons for changes in 
strategies vis-a-vis Brazil, as a host country for foreign direct investment, are 
the following: macroeconomic instability and government intervention.^" 
As far as macroeconomic instability is concerned, it is worth emphasizing 
that the most basic and direct factor which affects TNCs is the stagnation of 
the domestic market during the "lost decade", mostly the deep recession of 
the period 1981-83 and the stagnation of the period 1988-92. In this regard, it 
ight be said that, although the executives of TNCs have a clear perception 
that the external disequilibrium and the inflationary process are key 
macroeconomic problems, these two issues affect TNCs' perceptions and 
" For a fuller discussion of the environmental determinants of foreign direct investment, see 
Mucchielli (1985) 
' See, UNCTC , The determinants of foreign direct investment A survey of evidence. New York, 
United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, for a recent survey of ownership and 
locational specific factors. 
" Hood and Young (1979) See, also, UNCTC (1992, p 59). 
^ Jacquemot(1990). 
^° Gazeta Mercantil (29 September 1989). 
strategies in so far as tiiey are ttie basic determinants of expenditure-
switching and, mainly expenditure-reducing policies aiming at 
macroeconomic stabilization. 
Of course, this is not to say that TNCs are not influenced by the external 
debt crisis and the high inflation rates. As regards the debt crisis, one can 
say that the structural balance-of-payments disequilibrium has not led to any 
significant restriction on profit remittances or on any kind capital transfer by 
T N C s . " In this connection it may be noted that the basic legal instrument 
(Law n° 4131), which regulates foreign capital, has in its article 28, a 
provision which allows government to limit profit remittances in the case of 
serious balance-of-payments disequilibrium! 
Nor can be the fact be ignored that TNCs have significant economic and 
non-economic power which, in one way or another, allow then to overcome 
the basic problem brought about by a uncontrolled inflationary process, 
namely, the transfer of income among social groups or economic agents. In 
this regard, it may be pointed out the oligopolistic industries in which TNCs 
predominate, such as, transport equipment, pharmaceutical products, rubber, 
have been among those with a remarkable record of abusive pricing 
practices.'^ 
As far as government intervention is concerned, there are two different 
aspects which have a major influence on TNCs. The first one is very much 
related to the previous discussion about the use of business practices and 
pricing policies (mostly, via market power) to overcome the problems brought 
about by a strong inflationary process. Of foremost importance for TNCs is 
price control. This is, probably, the issue most often found in the public 
displays of TNCs positions. 
The second issue is related to policy predictability. More specifically, in the 
context of significant macroeconomic instability, TNCs are faced with a lack 
of policy predictability which has been the outcome of government failure to 
deal with the stabilization problems of the last decade or so. According to 
Joseph Mathews, Finance Director of Atlantic: "It is very difficult to convince 
our shareholders to invest in a country where the rules of the game changed 
" Even when the Collor administration froze the savings and heavily taxed financial assets, 
transnational corporations benefited from special treatment of their remittances of profits and 
dividends retained in the Central Bank (U$ 1.8 billion), which were paid installments by mid-1991. 
The Minister of Justice intends to take legal action against pharmaceutical firms which have had 
abusive price increases Most of these firms are subsidiaries of TNCs, which control 73% of total 
sales of pharmaceutical products in Brazil. Jornal do Brasil (25/10/92), As regards the automobile 
industry, there are several instances of price increases well above the general price indices in the 
last decade See, for instance, Isto é (18/11/87), p, 58 on Autolatina, For a defense of the 
automobile industry, see article of the director of Autolatina, Jacy de Souza Mendonça, "A realidade 
dos investimentos, remessa de lucros e custos". Gazeta Mercantil (14/10/89), 
every time".^^ 
It is interesting to note that, despite the political changes in the recent past 
- mostly, the transition from a military regime to a civilian regime, and the 
impeachment of the first-elected president of Brazil in the last forty years -, 
political instability is not seen, in general, as an obstacle for foreign direct 
investment in Brazil. According to Zeke Wimert, president of the American 
Chamber of Commerce: "The political crisis has affected neither the foreign 
investments in Brazil, nor the multinational enterprises operating here".^'' 
Perhaps, on account of the historical record, executives of TNCs have a 
strong confidence on the capacity of the Brazilian political elites for 
conciliation and reform! 
Moreover, it is hardly possible to overrate the value of the basic legal 
instruments regulating foreign capital in Brazil with respect to the building up 
of a favorable instrument climate. Since 1964 there has been no systematic 
complaints by TNCs about the Brazilian legislation. According to Fernando 
Albino de Oliveira, lawyer and expert on legal aspects related to foreign direct 
investment: "In spite of being old, the [Brazilian] law is extremely liberal to the 
extent that it does not define areas of enforcement, allows the free flow of 
currency and do not put major obstacles for investments".^^ Only in the last 
couple of years, and in the context of both the liberalization policies and the 
chaotic administrative changes of the Collor administration, representatives 
of TNCs started to put pressure on government so as to change this 
legislation. 
In this regard, it is worth noting that some of the administrative 
procedures, mostly related to the registration of reinvestments, have been 
changed according to the request made by TNCs. The supplementary 
income tax of 40-60% on profit remittances has also come to an end. The 
income withholding tax of 25% has also been reduced to 15%.^ ® 
Taking the TNCs' perspective, it might be said that there have been many 
positive, valuable factors in the Brazilian economy, factors that are in the long 
run likely to contribute to create a favorable investment climate and therefore, 
a "qualified optimism". Here a couple of quotations seem justified. According 
to Claudio Sonder, chairman of Hoechst, "Our confidence in Brazil in the long 
run is greater than our disappointment in the short r un " . " Tadahisa Ando (an 
enthusiastic Manager of the Mitsubishi Corporation) goes even further and 
Jornal do Brasil (21/04/91). 
Gazeta Mercantil (29/07/1992), 
Gazeta Mercantil (10/07/1992). 
GATT (14/09/1992). 
lstoé(18/11/1987), p. 65. 
asserts that "Brazil has a very positive investment perspective, the future 
seems bright".'^ Thus, in the context of great macroeconomic instability, 
TNCs have what can be called a "qualified optimism" regarding the Brazilian 
economy. 
2. TRADE STRATEGIES 
The baiance-of-payments problem of Brazil has been characterized by 
extraordinary trade surpluses and enormous external debt service (both of 
approximately US$ 130 billion since 1981). Consequently, from a financial 
standpoint, the external debt was "paid" with the trade surpluses. 
In the last 15 years or so, TNCs have dramatically changed their foreign 
trade performance, from a strong trade deficit in the mid-1970s to a 
significant trade surplus nowadays. This change in the strategic behavior of 
TNCs has been to very large extent determined by government policies 
oriented to macroeconomic stabilization. Moreover, during the 1980s the 
stagnant domestic market led TNCs to look for alternative outlets for their 
production in the external market. The export drive became a matter of 
specific interest for the TNC. 
Indeed, transnational enterprises have played a significant role in the 
Brazilian foreign trade. Since the late mid-1970s TNCs have changed their 
trade position, from deficit to surplus, owing to increases of their exports as 
well to government imports controls. The data for the period 1978-86 show 
annual average exports and imports by subsidiaries and affiliates of 
transnationals in Brazil of US$ 5.7 billion, which corresponded to annual 
average superavit of US$ 2.7 billion, which corresponded to approximately 
2/3 of Brazil's trade superavit in the period.^® The available data for 1986 
also indicate that majority -owned subsidiaries in Brazil accounted for 18% of 
total exports and 26% of total imports (excluding oil), whereas the share of 
TNCs in total manufactured exports was 28%).^ If one takes into account 
enterprises that are minority-owned affiliates, the share of transnationals on 
manufactured exports is approximately 40%.^^ As a result, there has been, 
as in the second half of the 1970s, an increase of the ratio of exports to total 
Gazeta Mercantil (01/12/1990, p. 01). 
BNDES (1988, p. 111) 
^° Zockun (1987, p21) . The data on imports excludes oil, given that oil foreign trade is a state 
monopoly. 
Willmore (1987), 
production of firms in Brazil, national and transnational alike. 
It is important to point out that since the mid-1970s the foreign trade 
behavior of TNCs in Brazil was characterized by the fact that they benefited 
from extraordinary export incentives and subsidies. Export promotion 
mechanism have been extensively used from the early 1970s until the late 
1980s, especially during the military regime. 
As a mat ter of t ransna t iona ls received special incent ives t rough 
mechanisms that were especial ly created so as to simulate the expansion 
of their exports. On the basis of the avai lable empirical evidence, it can 
be said that the ave rage subsidy/expor t ratio for t ransnat ionals was 
approximately 5 0 % . A s a result, transnationals received export subsidies 
of at least US$ 30 bil l ion dur ing the 1980s, that is, more than one fourth 
of the total external debt of Brazi l . 
In addition to give a non-negligible contribution to the balance-of-
payments adjustment through trade surpluses, TNCs have also played a 
major role in moving upwards Brazil's pattern of comparative advantage. In 
view of the enormous incentives and subsidies given by the military 
governments and the overwhelming presence of transnationals in the 
responsible for a very dynamic sectors, it is no surprise that TNCs became 
responsible for a very significant share of exports of dynamic tecnology-
intesive products and for the upgrading of Brazil's export structure.^^ 
It is worth emphasizing that the trade performance of transnationals in 
Brazil was to large extent determined by policy measures. In the early 1970s 
, before the first oil shock, the motivation of the military to promote an 
outward-oriented, model of economic growth - based on rapid export 
expansion and deeper penetration of transnational enterprises -, was 
determined by economic, political and military-strategic factors.^® As a matter 
of fact, the situation started to changed with the disequilibria caused by the 
first oil shock in 1974. In the context of a deep desequilibrium in the balance 
of payments, the policymakers, military and technocrats alike, started to 
apply measures aiming at reducing "external vulnerabilities". As a result, they 
Bielschowsky (1992). 
Baumann, (1989a). 
Baumann (1989b) The average export subsidy manufactured exports ratio was 59% during the 
periods 1969-1978. According to data from Zockun (1987), p.57, manufactured products 
represented 85% of total exports by transnational in 1986. Applying this ratio to the export 
subsidies/manufactured export ratio (59%), and assuming that non-manufactured exports received 
no subsidies, one finds an average ratio of export incentives and subsided to total exports for 
transnationals enterprise exported an annual average value of US$ 5.75 billion in the period 1978-
86. For the 1980s, it is possible to say that total exports by transnationals was about US$ 60 billion. 
Gonçalves (1987) 
Gonçalves (1992a) 
began to use an enormous and complex set of incentives and subsidies to 
stimulates exports. In addition, there were important tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, which meant a strong control of imports, and these barriers were 
also very powerful instruments to promote the structural reforms. That is, the 
external disequilibrium of the second half of the 1970s and the debt crisis of 
the 1980s were the main determinants of government policies, which affected 
significantly the trade performance of transnational in Brazil. 
Moreover, during the last decade the trade performance and behavior of 
TNCs were to a large extent influenced by the sluggish domestic market. In 
this regard, the low level of imports was also directly determined by a 
stagnant economy, where as the export drive was alternative outlet for 
domestic production. 
In the last couple of years, however, the policy of trade liberalization has 
had a bearing on TNCs strategies. On the one hand, one can say that in 
these last two years trade liberalization has not had a significant and direct 
impact on the performance of enterprises because of the gradual approach 
of trade policy. On the other hand, there seems to exist a consensus that the 
modernization of industry in Brazil does require a reduction of tariff and non-
tariff barriers inasmuch as protectionism has significantly contributed to 
market permissiveness, which has hindered competition and productively 
grovirth. 
As far as trade liberalization is concerned, it is worth pointing out that it 
has brought about a "reverse important substitution". Hence, there has been 
reduction in the recent surveys -, or brirlging to an the relations with local 
producers and suppliers. As an example, Xerox has been able to reduce the 
local content of photocopy machines from 90% to 40%, which implied a cost 
reduction of 30%.^'' Mercedes-Benz aims at reducing the local content to 
50%.^® Here, it might be added that another consequence of trade 
liberalization is the reduction of the trade surplus of TNCs. 
Indeed, the foreign trade behavior and performance of TNCs in Brazil 
have continuously changed since the mid-1970s. The external adjustment of 
the Brazilian economy led the governments to induce TNCs, through different 
mechanisms("stick and carrot" approach), to increases their exports and 
reduce imports. This phenomenon occurred even during the periods of 
expansion of the economy (mostly, in 1974-80).^® During the last decade, 
however, recession had become an important determinant of TNCs' trade 
strategies. 
Gazeta Mercantil (24/06/1991). 
Gazeta Mercantil (04/11/1992). 
Gon9alves (1983a). 
3. FINANCIAL STRATEGIES 
As a result of a recessive environment and great uncertainty, there has 
been a clear dovi/nward trend of the net flows of foreign direct investments 
into the Brazilian economy since the early 1980s. The net flows of foreign 
direct investment have become increasingly negative since the mid-1980s. 
Moreover, it seems that the remittance ratios have increased in the last few 
years. As a matter of fact, the reduction of foreign investment is a 
consequence of the decrease of capital expenditures by TNCs in their plants 
in Brazil. Data for a sample of 58 large TNCs show a average yearly 
reduction of 3 . 1 % of fixed assets and during the period 1984-89.^^ 
Given the macroeconomic instability, TNCs have also adopted a clear 
strategy of sharp reduction of their levels of indebtedness.^^ As a matter of 
fact, this is a general phenomenon associated with the strategies of large 
private enterprises, transnational and national alike, since the early 1980s. 
Indeed, the present levels of indebtedness of the large private enterprises in 
Brazil are very low. Moreover, there has been a restructuring of the assets of 
large TNCs in terms of growing diversification of investments in associated 
firms. The strategy of minimizing financial risk involves the distribution of the 
portfolios of TNCs.^^ This trend is more evident after 1984. 
Of foremost importance is the capacity of TNCs to increase their gross 
profit rates (mark up) during strong inflationary and recessive periods. This 
phenomenon is not a "privilege" of TNCs in so far as large local firms have 
also benefited from pricing mechanisms to maintain their levels of profit. 
The macroeconomic instability led TNCs also to take advantage of 
relatively high interest rates in Brazil during the last decade. In this regard, 
the financial profits have become an increasing source of resources for 
TNCs. This "defensive financial strategy" implies, inter ail, that TNCs have 
looked for greater flexibility regarding the use of their resources, as well as 
they have been able to keep significant internal funds (mostly from financial 
gains) for capital accumulation. According to an analyst, "the intensification of 
the 'recessive and inflationary' behavior of both the private local and foreign 
capital must have been a major determinant of their adjustment policies of 
since 1988".^" That is, large local firms and TNCs have benefited from 
™ The average ratio of profit remittances to the shock of foreign direct investment increased from 
7 . 1 % in 1977-79 to 7,7% in 1987-89, In 1989 the remittance ratio is 10 8% and for the first t ime 
ratio is higher than 10% 
Gomes e Novais (1991). It is worth noting that the sample of 123 local firms show an increase of 
fixed assets in the period 1984-89, p 26. 
Gomes e Novais (1991, p.12 and 30), 
Gomes e Novais (1991, p. 18 and 28), 
Bacic(1990, p,227), 
macroeconomic instability via financial profits and pricing mechanisms (mark-
up increases). 
As far as the foreign exchange risk is concerned, it is important to bear in 
mind that the crawling-peg system adopted in 1968 was only eliminated in 
1990. Hence, one can say that gains and losse from currency changes were 
minimized in the short-run on account of the predictability - via foreign 
exchange indexation - of the exchange rates. This is not to say that the risks 
were null all over the period. There were instances of strong devaluations 
(around 30%) which created risks. Besides, it is worth noting that there has 
been a clear trend of overvaluation of the Brazilian currency since the mid-
1980s. In this connection it has to be noted that TNCs (mostly the automobile 
firms) have persistently complained about the valuation of the Brazilian 
currency during the last decade.^^ 
Since 1990 the foreign exchange rate policy (a "bastard floating system") 
has also created a new element of uncertainty and instability. Hence, it may 
be said that the foreign exchange risk for TNCs would have increased since 
1990. There is no evidence that TNCs are adopting new system for 
managing exchange rate exposure in Brazil. However, the forward exchange 
market and the de-regulamentation of the exchange market have allowed 
them to reduce their exposure. TNCs can also engage in hedge operations 
through, for instance, the purchase of export notes that minimize their 
economic exposure as a result of unexpected changes in exchange rates.^® 
Among the changes in regulation, it is worth noting that "companies with 
registered foreign participation can open foreign exchange accounts, which 
can be credited with new foreign direct investments and re-investments, 
reserve profits, consolidated surplus, profits remittances, and returns and 
gains from profit remittances. Deposits are at LIBOR and normally require 90 
days notice for withdrawals, or 30 days in the case of deposits from profits or 
dividends and sales of investments and participating capital stock".^'^ 
Moreover, it is likely that TNCs have increased the use of transfer pricing 
mechanisms in their external trade transactions as a way of divestment. 
There are some reasons for that. First, the great relative importance of TNCs 
in Brazil's external trade. Second, TNCs have billions of dollars of assets in 
Brazil, whose economy has been stagnated. Third, despite the domestic 
market crisis, TNCs have been able to obtain profits. Fourth, TNCs seem to 
have an excess of internal funds that are been mostly oriented to financial 
Mendonça (1989), 
Export notes are issued by exporters in Brazil and have their face value denominated in foreign 
currency. They are used to finance the working capital of exporters, 
GATT (1992, p,51), 
investments and investments in associated firms. 
On the basis of the above considerations, one can advance the argument 
that TNCs seem to be adopting a "standstill strategy" in Brazil in the last few 
years. The financial strategy has involved a clear reduction or inflows of 
foreign capital and a net transfer of resources to their parent companies. A 
"defensive financial strategy" has been used to manage internal funds which 
have been oriented to the domestic financial and capital markets so as to 
benefit from high interest rates. Financial profits have offset the reduction of 
operational profits caused by the recessive situation. Moreover, TNCs have 
used their market power and, via the pricing formulation mechanism, have 
been able to obtain relatively high mark-ups in a stagnated and unstable 
economy. 
4. INDUSTRIAL STRATEGIES 
The industrial strategic behavior of TNCs may be better understood if one 
makes a distinction between the technological-organizational restructuring 
and the investment-production strategy. 
The first issue has been analyzed in a rather systematic way in recent 
works.^® The evidence available indicates that there has been an increase in 
the technological and organizational gap, both of large local firms and 
subsidiaries of transnational corporations. These firms tend to have a similar 
behavior with respect to their perceptions about the urgent need to 
modernize in terms of R&D activities, new organisational procedures, more 
efficient production techniques, scales and scope economies, more qualified 
labor-force and the increase of competitiveness.^® 
On the other hand, the evidence shows the low level of diffusion of 
modern technical procedures, such as, the industrial automation and 
organizational innovations, such as, the just-in-time relations with suppliers. 
To illustrate, Autolatina (Ford + Volkswagen) have only stared a just-in-time 
organizational network with suppliers on a large scale in 1992."° Here, one of 
the objectives is to reduce costs through lower stocks. In addition, Autolatina 
is aiming at a reduction of its degree of verticalization. The introduction of 
Bielschowsky and Ferraz (1990), and Bielschowsky (1992). 
The similarity of the patterns of behavior of TNCs and large local firms with respect to the 
technological innovation found in Bielschowsky and Ferraz (1990) was also found in a study by this 
author on external training, technical assistance, internal training and educational programs of 
TNCs and large local firms in Brazil; see Gonçalves (1986), p. 119-132. 
See the interview of Pierre-Alain De Smedt, chairman of Autolatina, in Gazeta Mercantil 
(17/09/92). Autolatina has 560 suppliers and the just-in-time program has started with 110 
suppliers. In the short-run, however, the program will affect between 20 and 30 suppliers. The goal 
is to reduce the average stock time from 21 days in December 1991 to 7 days by the end of 1992. 
new organizational techniques is intended to allow the largest car producer in 
Brazil to achieve greater competitiveness. 
The evolution of the economic crisis since the end of the 1980s seems to 
have shaken TNCs so that they became probably more conscious about the 
urgent need of restructuring. As a result, TNCs seem to be engaged in 
strategies aiming at greater efficiency through "important managerial 
changes, the rationalization of the production process, the introduction of new 
organizational techniques, output specialization and the reduction of vertical 
integration",''^ Without doubt, this process of structural adjustment in the 
context of a deep recession involves, first of all, the sizing down of plants 
and, secondly, the close down of factories. Both strategies imply the 
dismissal of workers. 
To illustrate this last aspect, Dow Chemical stopped the production of 
some chemical products (e. g., varnishes) in Brazil because of the recession. 
Alean has closed one of the two furnaces of its aluminum factory in Bahia. 
Even joint-ventures operations with Sanbra, which produced cleansing 
preparations, have been discontinued. Ford seems to take a strategy of 
divestment in Brazil after its minority association with Volkswagen and, also, 
decided for closing up of a car engine plant São Paulo in 1991."^ 
Nevertheless, the modernization and restructuring of TNCs in Brazil also 
involve strategies actively oriented to the reduction of costs, improvement of 
product quality and greater productivity. In this regard, TNCs are active in the 
formation of joint-ventures, for instance, in mining (mostly, gold 
production).''^ 
Moreover, some analysts are even forecasting a wave of fusions and 
acquisitions in Brazil in the near future.''" However, the evidence is 
insufficient to support this argument. Suffice it to say here that there are 
important examples of recent fusions in industries, such as, chemicals and 
metallurgy. The fusion of Shell Chemicals and the Italian Montecatini of their 
divisions of polypropylene and polyethylene will very probably lead to a fusion 
of their operations in Brazil through their respective subsidiaries (Polibrasil 
and PPH)."^ The fusion of Hoesch AG and Fried Krupp AG in Germany have 
led to a restructuring of their respective subsidiaries in Brazil (Hoesch 
Indústria de Molas Ltda e Krupp Metalúrgica Campo Limpo Ltda). There has 
already been the fusion of some departments (e. g., data processing) and the 
Bielschowsky (1992, op. c i t , p, 21), 
Gazeta Mercantil (04/11/1992), 
Gazeta Mercantil (06/10/1992), 
That is, for instance, the opinion of Peter Hornbostel, an American lawyer with expertise (and 
probably a lot of vested interests) on this subject, see Gazeta Mercantil (06/11/1992), 
Gazeta Mercantil (18/09/92), 
definition of a single policy vis-a-vis their common suppliers."® 
The fusion actives have also affected large local firms in Brazil. The 
production of locomotive was a duopoly of General Electric e Villares until two 
years ago. The recession led both enterprises to decide for establishing a 
single plant, with the transfer of the equipments of Villares to the plant of 
General Electric in Campinas, São Paulo. There is now an evident 
monopolistic market structure. 
The restructuring of TNCs has also been based on fusions and strategic 
alliances involving subsidiaries of TNCs in other countries of Latin America. 
The recent trade agreements, such as, Mercosul, have better conditions for 
this intra-regional restructuring of TNCs. For instance, Dow Chemical is 
restructuring its production of synthetic rubber latex in Argentina and Brazil."'^ 
The trade agreement with Argentina has also a specific protocol on road 
motor vehicles and parts and accessories which, without doubt, allows TNCs 
the restructuring of production and the redeployment of resources. TNCs like 
Scania, Cummins, Mercedes-Benz, Fiat, Ford, Volkswagen, and Volvo have 
benefited from the protocol in order to expand their intra-firm transactions. In 
this regard, it is worth noting that Volvo (Brazil) and Renault (Argentina) 
have, recently, announced an agreement of cooperation."^ The protocol on 
parts and tires has benefited several TNCs with subsidiaries in Brazil and 
Argentina, such as, Pirelli and Cibié."® The protocol on capital goods has 
also benefited the restructuring process of TNCs in so far a they control half 
of this industry in Brazil.^" 
The strategic behavior of TNCs has also involved the take-over of local 
firms. As a matter of fact, the long and deep recession of the last few years 
has facilitated the formation of joint ventures as well as the take-over of local 
firms. As an example of a take-over involving a medium-size firm, one can 
mention the case of the American trading company United Manda Inc. That 
bought the very last national producer of cigarettes (Companhia Sudan de 
Produtos de Tabaco), whose market share is 4 % and, consequently, 
domestic production is now the hands of TNCs (with the predominance of 
BAT and Phillip M o r r i s ) . T h e acquisition of a relatively large firm, leading 
producer of cleansing products (Orinex SA), by an Italian TNC (Brill Spa) is 
another interesting example inasmuch as Orinex is a profitable enterprise. 
"'^  Gazeta Mercantil (08/08/1992), 
Gazeta Mercantil (27/06/1991). 
Porta (1991, p.110). 
Gazeta Mercantil (26/08/1992) 
^° Gonçalves (1983b, p 71). 
Gazeta Mercantil (03/04/1992). 
Gazeta Mercantil (23/07/1991). 
Moreover, TNCs are taking advantage of recession and the fragility of 
local firms to penetrate into some markets. That is the case, for instance, of 
national private trading companies of cacao operating in the Southern region 
of Bahia that are going bankrupt. TNCs dealing with commodities are 
benefiting from this situation to become important buyers of cacao in this 
r e g i o n . M o r e o v e r , the end of the market reserve mechanism in the 
informatics industry has brought about several partnerships between local 
firms and TNCs.^" Microelectronics is likely to be one of the most important 
industries for investment opportunities (most probably via joint-ventures and 
acquisitions) in Brazil in the near future. 
In addition to the above changes in TNCs' strategic behavior, it is worth 
nothing that there has also been changes in terms of product mix. In this 
regard, and despite the recession and macroeconomic instability, Unilever 
through its subsidiary Gessy Lever is introducing a "global product" in Brazil -
a soap called Dove. The main reason this initiative is that Brazil has a large 
domestic market even for sophisticated products. 
A number of reasons have been advanced to explain why TNCs have 
adopted the above mentioned strategies. Without doubt, recession and 
macroeconomic instability are the major determinants. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
These general concluding remarks should be preceded by a comment: 
the fragmentary empirical information presented in the last two sections, 
used to provide some evidence in support of the arguments, should best be 
seen as suggestive or illustrative. 
Foreign capital has had a bearing upon the long-term evolution of the 
Brazilian economy. It means that, regardless of short - or medium-term 
fluctuations and changes, foreign capital and firms have been faced with a 
propitious and liberal environment in Brazil. In view of the historical record 
and taking a long-term perspective, there is no doubt that Brazil has always 
been an effective and potential market for foreign interests. 
Indeed, the market size and the potential market growth have been the 
main locational-specific advantages of the Brazilian economy. Moreover, 
there are institutional, social, political and even cultural factors in Brazil that 
have a major and positive influence on TNCs' expectations. The institutional 
Jornal do Brasil (18/12/1990) 
Olivetti, IBM, Fujitsu, NEC and several other TNCs have been engaged in or are negotiating the 
formation of joint-ventures in the electronic industry in Brazil See, for instance, Gazeta Mercantil 
(04/11/1992), 
Gazeta Mercantil (17/09/1992) 
and legal framework are quite liberal. The non-discriminatory and even 
favorable treatment received by foreign goods, services and investors is part 
of a socio-cultural process with strong roots in migration flows. Lastly, there is 
in Brazil a predominance - obtained both by consent and by force -, of values 
and beliefs, that have been internalized by the elites and, probably, by the 
other social groups. This hegemony is a valuable locational specific 
advantage which implies, inter ail, the predominance of the "logic of the 
market" (including, market power) and the "logic of capital". 
In this connection it is important to point out that TNCs have a significant 
economic power in Brazil. The extent to which the economic and non-
economic power in Brazil is concentrated in a handful of enterprises is 
indicated, for instance, by the fact that the 25 largest subsidiaries of TNCs 
are responsible for 52% of the total sales of the 550 largest non-financial 
transnational in Brazil.^® Here, it may be added that the largest 53 exporters 
and importers among TNCs were responsible for 20% of Brazil's total 
manufactured exports and total imports. Most of the technology-intensive 
industries are controlled by TNCs. Even though TNCs tend to predominate in 
industries in which the size of the enterprises is important, TNCs are also 
present in industries with the predominance of small and medium-size 
enterprises. Indeed, foreign capital - small, medium and large-size TNCs -, 
permeates Brazilian manufacturing.^^ TNCs account for an average share of 
73.7 percent of production, 74.3 percent of employment, 55 ,1% percent of 
capital and 7.9 percent of establishments of industries with the predominance 
of large-size enterprises. By contrast, in industries with the predominance of 
small enterprises, TNCs represent 29.3 percent of production, 26.0 percent 
of employment, 13.5 percent of capital and 1.4 percent of the number of 
establishments.^® By and large, the degree of predominance of TNCs in 
manufacturing tends to increase with the predominance of larger enterprises 
in industry. Without doubt, these aspects represents important economic 
sources of transnationals' power in Brazil. As a matter of fact, transnational 
enterprises have a great number of economic and non-economic sources of 
power in a developing country like Brazil.®" 
In the last decade, macroeconomic instability has had significant effects 
on TNCs performance and strategic behavior in Brazil. By and large, TNCs 
have been quite fast in responding through trade flows - a phenomenon 
'^^  Balanço Anual 1991. 
" Zockun (1987), p 2 1 
Gonçalves (1991a) 
Gonçalves (1991a), 
Gonçalves (1982). 
largely due to government policies, controls, subsidies and incentives from 
the mid-1970s until the late 1980s, and deep recession on account of 
expenditure-reducing policies in the last few years. TNCs have also had a 
speedy response in terms of financial strategies in the context of 
macroeconomic instability characterized by high inflation and high interest 
rates. TNCs have adapted themselves to the situation via, for instance, a 
significant reduction of indebtedness, and they have benefited from 
macroeconomic instability through substantive financial profits. As far as 
industrial restructuring is concerned, its seems that TNCs have being 
operating in slow-motion. The high degree of market permissiveness (i.e., 
great market power cum trade barriers), as well as the success of TNCs 
financial and trade strategies are likely to be the main reasons for this type of 
industrial strategic behavior. 
The argument that TNC is going to invest in Brazil as soon as the 
stabilization problems are overcome can be misleading.®^ First of all, TNCs 
have a high level of financial liquidity and, therefore, it is likely that the new 
capital expenditures will carried out with internal funds in national currency. 
That is, no direct balance-of-payments effect, expect for a reduction of profit 
remittances. Secondly, the level of idle capacity is quite high in most sectors 
in Brazil. In this regard, it will happen that recovery will be based on present 
installed capacities rather than new investments. Thirdly, a new wave of 
private investment implies a time gap after the achievement of 
macroeconomic stabilizations. It means that the inflow of substantive 
resources from parent companies is not foreseen in the near future. 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning the "hostage argument". According to 
some analysts, TNCs have a stock of billions of dollars in Brazil and, 
therefore, an attempt of massive withdrawal implies that their sunk costs 
would be very high. It means that a strategy of divestment could not be 
undertaken on a large scale. However, it seems of dubious value to analyze 
investment strategies of TNCs in terms of a binary question: Leave the 
country or not leave the country? 
This binary perspective conflicts bluntly with history and theory of foreign 
direct investment. Both foreign direct investment and divestment involve a 
long-term perspective. By the large, locational-specific advantages or 
disadvantages tend to change gradually over time. They are much more 
stock-related factors than flow-related factors (i.e., one often deals with 
location-specific endowments).®^ 
Gonçalves (1991b), 
Dunning (1992), especially. Chapter 1, "Trade, location of economic activity and the multinational 
enterprise: a search for an eclectic approach". See also, Gonçalves (1992b), 
Parent companies have reduced significantly their investments in their 
subsidiaries in Brazil. There has also been a net transfer of resources to the 
home country. By the large, transnational corporations are not using their 
internal funds to expand their fixed assets. These internal funds have been 
reinvested in the financial and capital markets, as well as there seems to 
exist diversification of risk with investments in associated firms. On the other 
hand, there are no massive divestment flows.®^ 
By and large, one has the impression that TNCs adopted a "standstill 
strategy" with respect to Brazil all over the last decade. This strategy involved 
"stopping investments, low levels of production, high prices and waiting for 
events".®" 
Moreover, the basic argument is that TNCs have adopted a retrenchment 
strategy in the last few years. That is, TNCs are moving from the standstill 
strategy, which seems to have predominated since the early 1980's, to a 
retrenchment strategy brought about by the deep economic crisis of the last 
three years. Hence, while it is true that TNCs recognize the urgent need to 
engage in deep restructuring, it is probably even truer that they are keeping a 
low profile with respect to the Brazilian market. 
The fundamental question is the following: Why have TNCs not shifted 
from a standstill strategy to a more drastic divestment initiative? In other 
words: Why are TNCs in a rather transnational phase, adopting a 
retrenchment strategy? ®^ 
The simple answer is that, in part, the market size and potential of Brazil 
are still major locational advantages. In part, it may have been that TNCs are 
having reasonable rates of rentability for their capital invested in Brazil, 
mostly through financial market operations and the exercise of market power, 
and, perhaps, through transfer pricing mechanisms in their foreign trade 
activities. 
At this point the reader may very naturally ask: If there had been no 
persistent pattern of sky-high interest rates in Brazil in the last few years, 
would TNCs carried out a more open and aggressive divestment strategy? 
The same type of question might asked with respect to the transfer pricing 
mechanisms (external trade) and the price formation mechanism in the 
domestic market (via mark-up): If there had been no excessive market 
power, would TNCs have kept their "standstill strategy" in the context of great 
'^ ^ For an empirical analysis of the flows of foreign direct investment in Brazil, see Gonçalves, 
1993. 
Wil l iam Meissmer, member of the Executive Committee of the American Chamber of 
Commerce, Gazeta Mercantil (16/02/1991). 
The expression "retrenchment strategy" was suggested by Professor Maria da Conceição 
Tavares in the Capinas seminar, November 1992. 
macroeconomic instability? 
These questions deserve answer. Given the depth and the scope of the 
macroeconomic crisis in Brazil, it is likely that TNCs would be undertaking 
more open and active divestment strategies if there had been no market 
permissiveness (TNCs extraordinary market power) and absurd monetary 
policies (extremely high interest rates) in the last few years. The core of the 
problem is that these mechanisms do reinforce stabilization problems! 
Here, it is worth digressing for a moment on the comparative behavior of 
TNCs and large domestic groups. The evidence suggests that in growth 
periods there seems to exist no significant differences in the performance of 
TNCs and large domestic enterprises regarding profitability, growth rates, 
productivity, choice of technology, technological spill-overs, external trade 
and so on, when differences in size and product mix are taken into 
account.®® During periods of macroeconomic instability and stagnation, 
however, it may happen that the greater degree of freedom of TNCs, with 
respect to the transfer of resources across national frontiers, has a bearing 
on TNCs' financial strategies. That is, net transfers of resources to the parent 
company appears as an alternative channel for the use of subsidiaries 
internal funds. This alternative is rather limited in the case of domestic 
groups. 
Hence, one can advance the argument that, as far as trade and industrial 
strategies are concerned, TNCs and large domestic groups seem to be 
undertaking the same strategies in the last few years, mainly, on account of a 
common environment.®'' Notwithstanding the similarity of aspects of the 
financial strategies (e.g. lower indebtedness) of large domestic groups and 
companies. In this regard, the origin of ownership matters! 
To conclude, the "qualified optimism" of transnational corporations with 
respect to Brazil is largely due to past experience, rather than future 
expectations. For how long will TNCs keep on adopting a "retrenchment 
strategy"? Given that this situation is no static one, it is relevant to put 
forward other related questions: For how long will TNCs keep moving away 
from a "standstill strategy" and, most probably, in the direction of a 
"divestment strategy"? What are the main determinants of foreign direct 
investment which have a bearing on this phenomenon? What factors be 
influenced by government policies? How global changes and global 
strategies influenced by of TNCs are affecting the behavior of subsidiaries in 
'''' See, for instance, Gonçalves (1983c) 
The paper by Bielschowsky and Ferraz (1990) present evidence in support of this argument 
regarding technological behavior The work by Bielschowsky (1992), however, seems to playdown 
industrial restructuring in local manufacturing enterprises 
Brazil? What constraints and opportunities are being created for a pheriferical 
economy? What are the policy implications with respect to TNCs? Is it time 
for promoting greater liberalization or introducing performance requirements? 
These will go on being key questions in the political and economic agenda, 
mostly in so far as macroeconomic instability persists in Brazil in the future. 
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SINOPSE 
INSTABILIDADE MACROECONÔMICA 
E AS ESTRATÉGIAS DAS CORPORAÇÕES TRANSNACIONAIS 
NO BRASIL: IMOBILIDADE, RECUO GRADUAL OU DESINVESTIMENTO 
A crise econômica brasileira vem obrigando as empresas a definirem novas estratégias. As 
empresas transacionais (Ets) têm uma forte presença na economia brasileira, principalmente, 
na indústria de transformação Neste sentido, é importante analisar as orientações estratégicas 
que elas têm adotado no Pais, Após uma análise de suas estratégias nas esferas comercial, 
financeira, tecnológica e organizacional no periodo recente, chega-se à conclusão de que 
estariam adotando uma estratégia defensiva, transitando de uma estratégia de imobilidade, 
para outra de recuo gradual. Os determinantes mais importantes da reação estratégica, 
conduta e desempenho das ETs no Brasil, nos últimos anos, foram a condução da politica de 
estabilização macroeconômica (politica monetária) e a permissividade do mercado brasileiro 
